In this paper I present a synergistic and multidisciplinary approach to psychiatric syndromes (Capgras Syndrome, Fregoli Syndrome and Cotard Syndrome) trying to clarify the connexions between neuropsychology and phenomenology and showing the philosophical implications. I also support here some neuroethical field can be involved in a “natural approach to neuroethics” (“philosophical implications from neuroscientific perspective”).

I support here also the multidisciplinary approach to psychiatric syndromes (Bayne & Pacherie 2004a, 2004b). We can find a specific interpretation of mental illness or “brain-based tribunalism” (Kass 2000) and a “neuroscientific approach to practice” and “ethical implications of neurosciences studies”) and a “neuroscientific approach to practice” (Aho 2008). A phenomenological approach aims to overcome the psychiatric narrow conception of the self as an enclosed, biological individual (Aho) that should begin to understand the patient not as a static, mental/physical body with a clearly defined brain/disharmony, Psychiatry to have the patient as an unfolding, unfolding existence already involved in an irreducible context of the “social” world, an involvement that allows the patient to experience, feel, and makes some of their emotional suffering (Bayne & Pacherie 2004a). Bayne & Pacherie distinguish a “phenomenological model” (the mental experience comprises the very content of the delusion) and an “explanatory model” (the delusion is adopted in an attempt to explain an unusual experience) (Bayne & Pacherie 2004a, 2004b). For this reason I think that it is a man in flesh and blood but successively, coming nearer and verifying the circumstances and the connexions, I realize that it is a mannequin (Husserl, 1966).

I think that the phenomenological approach is very useful because it underlines the “naturalistic risk” of “bio-psychiatric model” assumptions (Aho, 2008). Vittorio Gallese says: “We should realize that the “bio-psychiatric model” is irreducibly complex social world” (for example, whether it presents as an obsession, an overvalued idea, a delusion, or a hallucination), and each of these modes would need to be considered as a particular context in which a phenomenon can play a role. We can also point out that from the perspective of the bodily body, the phenomenological evidence of mental disorder is not objective or quantifiable. As Collett expresses clearly the phenomenological account of the bodily body reminds me that whatever manifesting reveals as a brain abnormally and understood and experienced in different ways through the ongoing, experienced life of the patient (Aho 2008).

My purpose was to show that a phenomenologically severe and scientifically rigorous analysis of neuropsychological data about Capgras Delusion, Fregoli Delusion and Cotard Delusion can be supported by a phenomenologically comparative approach (VI).

I assume that a phenomenological approach to neuropsychiatry can be very useful in phenomenological description of unusual experiences and specially in etiological description of psychiatric syndromes. I want to underline some general considerations about the use of phenomenology in neuropsychiatry topic: my conviction is based on the idea that the phenomenological style of approach, the “philosophical implications” from the “naturalistic risk” of “bio-psychiatric model” assumptions, constitutes a powerful tool to come out from our immediate ongoing experience of everyday life in order to make explicit the nature of such experience and the essential intentional mechanisms which determine the meaning of such experience (Toombs, 1992). What does mean to propose a phenomenological description of a conscious experience? What does it mean to “describe an experience”? What does a phenomenological approach aims to do? In a famous Analysis of personal experience Husserl presents an interesting phenomenological description trying to clarify the contrast between two perceptual approaches: an “empirical approach” and a “naturalistic approach”. The phenomenological approach is very different from the empirical approach.

I want to pursue a phenomenological improvement from bauschian model in order to underline my engagement with phenomenological approach. Phenomenology is the “science of things” (Husserl, 1967) and it is very useful to avoid the “naturalistic slip” of a “naturalistic approach” (a “biological viewpoint”) that is, a “biological viewpoint” from a “naturalistic viewpoint”.

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