Spring Session 2014

Rossana Raviola (University of Pavia)

February 3 MON — 12.30-14.30

Sala Riunioni — Direzione del Dipartimento (Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano)

Semantica dei sortali e ontologia. Un compromesso fra nominalismo e realismo

AbstractUn sortale è un termine del linguaggio e nella fattispecie un termine generale – un predicato. Diversamente dai predicati esprimenti aspetti o caratteristiche, il sortale è un predicato che esprime ciò che è l’oggetto a cui esso è applicato, ovvero la sua essenza. Il problema concernente la semantica dei sortali è allora un caso specifico del problema degli universali, quest’ultimo inteso come questione semantica volta a chiarire se e in che modo i termini generali siano da considerarsi termini referenziali alla maniera dei termini individuali. Come per il problema generale degli universali, anche per ciò che concerne i sortali le varie concezioni sono suddivisibili in nominaliste e realiste secondo che a tali termini venga negata o meno un’autentica funzione denotativa. Secondo i realisti, l’approccio più soddisfacente alla semantica dei termini sortali consiste nell’attribuir loro un ruolo autenticamente referenziale, considerando, in qualità di loro referenti, i cosiddetti kinds, giacché le leggi scientifiche risultano meglio interpretabili se sono intese come proposizioni riguardanti i kinds quali loro soggetti logici. Da un punto di vista strettamente semantico sembra dunque che le concezioni realiste siano in vantaggio rispetto alla concorrenti nominaliste. Tuttavia, oltre agli aspetti prettamente semantici della questione, vi sono veri e propri aspetti ontologici che non sono nient’affatto trascurabili. Che cosa sono i kinds dal punto di vista ontologico? Sia che lo status ontologico dei kinds sia concepito alla maniera aristotelica piuttosto che alla maniera platonica o, ancora, alla maniera concettualista, le difficoltà sono molteplici. Pertanto, se in sede semantica sembrano avere la meglio le ipotesi realiste, in sede ontologica godono di maggior credito e favore le ipotesi nominaliste. Tuttavia, è davvero necessario contrapporre le dimensioni ontologica e semantica in relazione alla questione dei sortali? Ciò che si mostrerà è che, al contrario, tale contrapposizione non occorre affatto, e lo si mostrerà a partire dal legame fra termini sortali e leggi scientifiche su cui fanno leva i realisti, portando a galla ed esaminando le ambiguità di significato insite in alcuni particolari enunciati deducibili da quelle leggi. Le conseguenze derivanti da tali analisi condurranno alla possibilità di trovare una posizione intermedia, almeno per quanto concerne i sortali, fra realismo e nominalismo.

 

Paolo Leonardi (University of Bologna)

February 10 MON — 12.30-14.30

Sala Riunioni — Direzione del Dipartimento (Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano)

La sostanza della verità (The Substance of Truth)

Abstract: Sosterrò che la verità non è una categoria vuota – e non lo è due volte. Non lo è una prima volta.  La verità è diversa dalla realtà.  Della realtà siamo parte e di essa, anche se non solo di essa, parliamo; la verità concerne l’adeguatezza di alcune rappresentazioni linguistiche, ed è cioè una proprietà che alcune rappresentazioni linguistiche hanno o di cui mancano.  Non lo è una seconda volta.  Per stabilire se un’affermazione è adeguata, infatti, usiamo dei parametri, cosa che facciamo prendendo per vere alcune affermazioni.  I parametri per indagare l’adeguatezza di alcune rappresentazioni linguistiche hanno un contenuto, sono cioè “compromesse”, per così dire, con la  realtà, e non hanno una natura puramente concettuale.  Svilupperò questo punto riprendendo liberamente un’idea di Moritz Schlick e di Reichenbach. Se la verità è una proprietà dotata di sostanza, le teorie della verità minimaliste, e anche quelle modeste,  sono insoddisfacenti, perché si riducono all’eliminazione del predicato ‘è vero’, mentre qualunque enunciato, almeno qualunque enunciato assertivo, ha un problema di verità, anche quelli che non contengono il predicato ‘è vero’. 

 

Davide Bordini (University of Milano)

February 24 MON — 12.30-14.30

Sala Riunioni — Direzione del Dipartimento (Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano)

Intentionalism and the Problem of Moods

AbstractIntentionalism is a theory concerning the nature of phenomenal character (what it’s like), according to which the phenomenal character of experience is entirely reducible/identical to what experience represents (Dretske 1995; Lycan 1996, 2001; Tye 1995, 2000). This view is strongly motivated by the phenomenological evidence that our sensory experiences appear to be directed upon specific objects: e.g., we see red cars parked over the street, we hear sounds coming from the street, etc. However, when it comes to other kinds of experiences, such as moods (states like anxiety or depression or elation), Intentionalism has hard times. Indeed, moods do not seem to be directed at any object. On the contrary, they appear as “raw feelings:” purely qualitative experiences rather than representations. In this talk I introduce the problem of moods, discuss some recent intentionalist replies and argue that they are not convincing.

 

Pierluigi Graziani (University of Urbino)

March 10 MON — 12.30-14.30

Sala Riunioni — Direzione del Dipartimento (Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano)

Logica formale e storia della matematica greca

AbstractIl seminario rifletterà sulla domanda: la logica formale può aiutare la nostra comprensione della matematica greca antica?. Si proverà a dare una risposta a tale domanda considerando alcuni casi studio, in particolare: il significato dei postulati di Euclide; la dinamica dell’antico metodo di analisi e sintesi; l’attribuzione di generalità alle dimostrazioni matematiche greche.

 

Marco Santambrogio (University of Parma)

March 21 FRI — 13.00-15.00

PLACE: Aula Crociera Alta

Words, Pencils, and Artworks

AbstractThe semantics of a referential expression is externalist if it is not the case that its reference is determined by some uniquely identifying marks, some unique properties satisfied by the referent and known or believed to be true of that referent by the speaker. I claim that the semantics of artifactual words, like table and pencil, is externalist. Here is my strategy. First, the words of all languages, even though they are unlikely to occur to anyone as primary instances of artifacts, are in fact prototypical artefacts. Second, a Principle of Common Ancestry is in the nature of words: Two utterances or inscriptions belong to the same word only if they have some common ancestor. The same principle obviously holds for biological species and is sufficient for Twin Earth thought experiments to go through. In order to complete my defense of externalism concerning artifactual words in general, I only have to show that the metaphysics of all artifacts obeys the Principle of Common Ancestry. I will draw on the works by Paul Bloom and Jerrold Levinson, who have defended some version of the Principle, albeit using different terminology.

 (The talk will be in English)

Elena Casetta (CFCUL - Centre for Philosophy of Science of the University of Lisbon)

March 24 MON — 12.30-14.30

Sala Riunioni — Direzione del Dipartimento (Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano)

Biodiversity Surgery

Elena Casetta & Jorge L.M. da Silva

AbstractIn his foundational article, “What Is Conservation Biology?” (1985), Michael Soulé explains that Conservation biology is often a crisis discipline and claims that its relation to biology or ecology “is analogous to that of surgery to physiology and war to political science. In crisis disciplines, one must act before knowing all the facts; crisis disciplines are thus a mixture of science and art, and their pursuit requires intuition as well as information.” This presentation is about such surgery. Firstly, some data about the so-called “Big Sixth”—the disease at issue and its severity—will be presented. Then epistemic and epistemological difficulties of the initial phases of the surgery, namely extinction assessment and conservation prioritization, will be pointed out. In conclusion, it will be suggested that the extent of these difficulties is of such significance to require a thorough re-assessment of the very nature of the patients, i.e., outside the metaphor, of the concept of species.

Giuseppe Varnier (University of Siena)

March 31 MON — 12.30-14.30

Sala Riunioni — Direzione del Dipartimento (Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano)

First Person (Quasi-)Indexicality: Problems and Philosophical Applications

AbstractI shall try to do a couple of things that are both unusual and, hopefully, interesting. If you worry about the semantics of epistemology and its import too, you cannot be satisfied with the following typical schema as an object of epistemological study: 

(A-IIIS) S (...) believes that P

(Insert for (...) justifiedly, on the ground of evidence, truly or veridically, or falsely, fallibistically, propositionally or not (?), or whatever relevant specifications you wish to work on.)

I shall rather consider (1) the first person singular, and (2) mostly the implications of knowledge, or seeing – not just belief – assertions in the first person singular (in general, factive or semi-factive attitudes). I do not mean to focus only on first person sg. assertions, or sentences (and possibly related propositions), that embed first person sg. clauses as main clauses (propositions), though these are interesting, and will be considered. 

As we shall see, they force us to meditate about de se attributions, and its various types, immunity to error and private access. The bulk of my analysis by examples is indeed concerned with the consequent phenomenon of first person sg. quasi-indexicality. I stress that it is to be analysed differently than 3rd person sg. quasi-indexicality: for instance, that it seems less related to anaphora in a general sense, that it is relevant for various conceptions of first-personal knowledge or inner knowledge (and whether it is knowledge, or can at least be expressed third-personally or linguistically at all), and finally that it is, in a sense, epistemologically foundational, but also not metaphysically prior, with respect to 3rd person sg. quasi-indexicality – and the general concept of consciousness. 

I shall further show how even some Gettier cases are sensitive for common intuitions to the 3rd/first person sg. difference. These aspects are also relevant for understanding how (self-)consciousness is relevant for language, and vice versa, and even for the evolution of consciousness. As a first general result, however, first person sg. main clauses (embedding sentences) offer us new insights into the nature of epistemic and doxastic attitudes, and cast doubts about various recent conceptions of knowledge. For instance, many will insist anew these days that “know” is not context-sensitive. But it does seem to be sensitive to shifts in verbal person at least, and to embedment. 

The problems connected with plural first person indexicality are very complex, though they seem to confirm this line of approach. I have some remarks about them, and other bizzarre phenomena in language (such as nominalized (quasi-)indexicals, which I call semi-indexicals: Das Ich (Ego), das Dasein, Das Du, le moi, il mio lui, he-man, she-male, the hic et nunc, the Self, “Forever”, My being, tutto il tuo essere, etc.; quasi-mass words that are indexical by default and/or take plurals: the sky, many skies, the moon, Paris’ moon etc. vs water, snow, whereas “the snow”, is indexical). Along with some well-known phenomena in language learning, they all suggest a sort of epistemological, not metaphysical, centrality of the first person in language and our thinking about the world through language. Strong contextualist and even relativist conclusions about indexicality also seem hard to avoid, though they must be, to some extent at least, resisted.

(If there is any time left, I shall sketch a mini-theory of episodic memory as expressed by (and codified in) first person sg. quasi-indexical thoughts (embedded clauses), based on some views by H.-N- Castañeda and T. Burge.)

Wolfgang Huemer (University of Parma)

April 7 MON — 12.30-14.30

Sala Riunioni — Direzione del Dipartimento (Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano)

Manner Matters. Reference, Truth, and Literary Form

AbstractThe recent debate in the philosophy of literature – a discipline that has received more and more attention in recent years – has focused mainly on problems that are directly related to or stem from the question concerning truth and reference in literary works of art: the ontological status of fictional characters, the cognitive value of literature, the paradox of fiction, i.e., the question of whether we can feel genuine emotions for fictional characters, etc. Most of the theories that have been developed are deeply based in a general theory of language, knowledge or ontology, with the result that very often they do not display a genuine interest in literature, but rather a systematic interest in philosophy of language, epistemology, philosophy of mind, or metaphysics that are applied to literature as a somewhat extravagant border-case, in which language is on holiday. As a consequence, they often focus on fiction rather than literature. In my paper I will suggest that it is important to bring literature back into the philosophy of literature. The notions “literature” and “fiction” are not synonymous, nor are the co-referential. They rather refer to very different aspects of a work – sometimes of one and the same work. If we come to see literary  works as works of art and pay due attention to their stylistic dimension, I will argue, we can get a better grasp on the problems mentioned above and will be able to pay due attention to problems of the  philosophy of literature that in the current debate are often ignored. 

(The conference will be held in English)