Standard intentionalism has it that the phenomenal character of an experience is identical to the experience’s intentional content, where the latter is taken to be identical to what the experience represents. Many authors have argued that standard intentionalism cannot account for the affective phenomenology of pains, pleasures, emotions, and moods—i.e., it cannot account for the fact that these experiences feel good or bad. Klein (2007), Hall (2008), and Martínez (2010) have responded to this challenge by developing a non-standard version of intentionalism: imperativism. According to this view, the phenomenal character of an experience is identical to the experience’s intentional content, but representational content is not the only type of intentional content. Some experiences rather have imperative content—a content that commands rather than describes. Affective experiences are experiences of this kind. In particular, their affective phenomenology is nothing over and above the issuing of certain commands. In this paper, I will show that extant versions of imperativism face serious difficulties. However, not all is lost. I will develop an alternative version of imperativism that eschews such problems.