November 28 THU  — 14.30-16.30

Sala Riunioni — Direzione del Dipartimento (Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano)

Concepts, Conceptions and Indexicals

Abstract: In the first part of the talk, I will argue that there are two meanings of ‘concept’. Concepts in the intentional sense are essentially components of thoughts which refer to objects in the world. In the epistemic sense, a concept is the ability (which can be more or less reliable) to form categorization judgements. I will argue that the two notions should be distinguished, and that it is convenient to use the word ‘concept’ for the first notion, and the word ‘conception’ for the second. I will then look at a particular theory of concepts recently proposed by Sainsbury and Tye, originalism, which is compatible, and indeed sits well with, the distinction. The main idea of originalism is that concepts are individuated by their origin. The way Sainsbury and Tye develop the view entails the rejection of the idea that identity of content is necessary for identity of concepts. I will argue that a modified version of originalism, which includes this principle, is more plausible than Sainsbury and Tye’s view. The modified version of the view has the consequence that there are no indexical concepts, but this is not an objection, in the light of the distinction between concepts and conceptions.