The Seminars of Perception, Mind, and Language (former Seminars of Philosophy of Language and Mind) take place every year since 2001 at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Milan. The meetings aim at being an opportunity for people working in analytic philosophy to debate the latest directions of research.
The meetings are structured as a 45-50 minutes presentation, followed by an extensive discussion time. They are open to anyone interested in the topic, especially undergraduate and Ph.D. students. The language of the talks is either Italian or English.
12/02 — Christopher Gauker (Salzburg), "Against the Speaker-intention Theory of Demonstratives”
19/02 — Jeff Pelletier (Alberta), “How to Make Some Many-Valued Logics be Useful”
26/02 — Vittorio Morato (Padua), “Concepibilità kripkeana e modalità epistemiche”
05/03 — Delia Belleri (Vienna), “Two Species of Merely Verbal Dispute”
12/03 — Robert Briscoe (Glasgow), “Models, Imagination, and Pictorial Understanding”
19/03 — Wolfgang Huemer (Parma), “Fiction: Neither Ornament nor Instrument – but Practice”
26/03 — Max Koelbel (Vienna), “Conversational Score and Harmful Speech”
16/04 — Massimiliano Vignolo (Genoa), “Testare empiricamente le teorie del riferimento: alcuni problemi”
23/04 — Carlotta Pavese (Duke), “Presuppositions and the Regress of the Premises” [CANCELED]
07/05 — Jocelyn Benoist (Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne), “A Realistic Approach to Fiction” [CANCELED]
14/05 — Dorothy Edgington (Birkbeck, London), “Counterfactuals and Indeterminacy”
MON MAY 14 — 15.00-17.00
Sala "Enzo Paci" — Direzione del Dipartimento (Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano)
Counterfactuals and Indeterminacy
Many counterfactuals seem to have no determinate truth value, and yet are easily judged to be probable or improbable, for instance: 'If you had picked a red ball it would have had a red spot (when 90% of the red balls have black spots); 'If I had approached, the dog would have attacked me'; 'If you had had the operation, you would have been cured'. I consider a way of treating this indeterminacy, which can also be applied to vague statements, and show that it is compatible with the conditionals having truth conditions, although it is often indeterminate what their truth value is.