The Seminars of Philosophy of Perception, Mind, and Language
The Seminars of Perception, Mind, and Language (former Seminars of Philosophy of Language and Mind) take place every year since 2001 at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Milan. The meetings aim at being an opportunity for people working in analytic philosophy to debate the latest directions of research.
The meetings are structured as a 45-50 minutes presentation, followed by an extensive discussion time. They are open to anyone interested in the topic, especially undergraduate and Ph.D. students. The language of the talks is either Italian or English.
Davide Bordini (University of Milano)
February 24 MON — 12.30-14.30
Sala Riunioni — Direzione del Dipartimento (Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano)
Intentionalism and the Problem of Moods
Abstract: Intentionalism is a theory concerning the nature of phenomenal character (what it’s like), according to which the phenomenal character of experience is entirely reducible/identical to what experience represents (Dretske 1995; Lycan 1996, 2001; Tye 1995, 2000). This view is strongly motivated by the phenomenological evidence that our sensory experiences appear to be directed upon specific objects: e.g., we see red cars parked over the street, we hear sounds coming from the street, etc. However, when it comes to other kinds of experiences, such as moods (states like anxiety or depression or elation), Intentionalism has hard times. Indeed, moods do not seem to be directed at any object. On the contrary, they appear as “raw feelings:” purely qualitative experiences rather than representations. In this talk I introduce the problem of moods, discuss some recent intentionalist replies and argue that they are not convincing.