Seminars of Philosophy of Perception, Mind, and Language

Giuseppe Varnier (University of Siena)

March 31 MON — 12.30-14.30

Sala Riunioni — Direzione del Dipartimento (Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano)

First Person (Quasi-)Indexicality: Problems and Philosophical Applications

Abstract: I shall try to do a couple of things that are both unusual and, hopefully, interesting. If you worry about the semantics of epistemology and its import too, you cannot be satisfied with the following typical schema as an object of epistemological study: 

(A-IIIS) S (...) believes that P

(Insert for (...) justifiedly, on the ground of evidence, truly or veridically, or falsely, fallibistically, propositionally or not (?), or whatever relevant specifications you wish to work on.)

I shall rather consider (1) the first person singular, and (2) mostly the implications of knowledge, or seeing – not just belief – assertions in the first person singular (in general, factive or semi-factive attitudes). I do not mean to focus only on first person sg. assertions, or sentences (and possibly related propositions), that embed first person sg. clauses as main clauses (propositions), though these are interesting, and will be considered. 

As we shall see, they force us to meditate about de se attributions, and its various types, immunity to error and private access. The bulk of my analysis by examples is indeed concerned with the consequent phenomenon of first person sg. quasi-indexicality. I stress that it is to be analysed differently than 3rd person sg. quasi-indexicality: for instance, that it seems less related to anaphora in a general sense, that it is relevant for various conceptions of first-personal knowledge or inner knowledge (and whether it is knowledge, or can at least be expressed third-personally or linguistically at all), and finally that it is, in a sense, epistemologically foundational, but also not metaphysically prior, with respect to 3rd person sg. quasi-indexicality – and the general concept of consciousness. 

I shall further show how even some Gettier cases are sensitive for common intuitions to the 3rd/first person sg. difference. These aspects are also relevant for understanding how (self-)consciousness is relevant for language, and vice versa, and even for the evolution of consciousness. As a first general result, however, first person sg. main clauses (embedding sentences) offer us new insights into the nature of epistemic and doxastic attitudes, and cast doubts about various recent conceptions of knowledge. For instance, many will insist anew these days that “know” is not context-sensitive. But it does seem to be sensitive to shifts in verbal person at least, and to embedment. 

The problems connected with plural first person indexicality are very complex, though they seem to confirm this line of approach. I have some remarks about them, and other bizzarre phenomena in language (such as nominalized (quasi-)indexicals, which I call semi-indexicals: Das Ich (Ego), das Dasein, Das Du, le moi, il mio lui, he-man, she-male, the hic et nunc, the Self, “Forever”, My being, tutto il tuo essere, etc.; quasi-mass words that are indexical by default and/or take plurals: the sky, many skies, the moon, Paris’ moon etc. vs water, snow, whereas “the snow”, is indexical). Along with some well-known phenomena in language learning, they all suggest a sort of epistemological, not metaphysical, centrality of the first person in language and our thinking about the world through language. Strong contextualist and even relativist conclusions about indexicality also seem hard to avoid, though they must be, to some extent at least, resisted.

(If there is any time left, I shall sketch a mini-theory of episodic memory as expressed by (and codified in) first person sg. quasi-indexical thoughts (embedded clauses), based on some views by H.-N- Castañeda and T. Burge.)

• < Prev
• Next >