The Seminars of Philosophy of Perception, Mind, and Language
The Seminars of Perception, Mind, and Language (former Seminars of Philosophy of Language and Mind) take place every year since 2001 at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Milan. The meetings aim at being an opportunity for people working in analytic philosophy to debate the latest directions of research.
The meetings are structured as a 45-50 minutes presentation, followed by an extensive discussion time. They are open to anyone interested in the topic, especially undergraduate and Ph.D. students. The language of the talks is either Italian or English.
Rosanna Keefe (University of Sheffield)
June 16 MON — 12.30-14.30
Aula 435 — Direzione del Dipartimento (Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano)
Validity, normativity and degrees of belief
Abstract: The assessment of an argument as valid appears to have normative import in relation to how we should reason. Suppose we reject or question the standard definition of validity as necessary preservation of truth. Can we illuminate or characterise what it is for an argument to be valid by appealing to the distinctive normative role of valid arguments? And might such considerations help us in choosing between alternative logics, or at least in understanding what should guide such choices? I will ask how to characterise the normative role of validity, in particular when we consider that many of our beliefs are merely partial (in the sense we have some level of uncertainty in them). I will focus in particular on two principles that Hartry Field advocates and ask whether they can be used in characterisation of validity and/or to help illuminate choices between different logics that people might advocate or employ. I will argue that Field’s principles are not fit for this job and no alternative principles can retain the required neutrality either. The normative situation is derivative, complex and can vary with context; it cannot provide the key to understanding validity.