Stefano Di Bella (Milano)
April 20 Mon — 11.00-13.00
Aula Seminari — Aula Direzione di Dipartimento (Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano)
Realism versus Conventionalism in Leibniz’s Confrontation with Locke
on the Names for Natural Kinds
Abstract.
“Je ne sais pourquoi on veut toujours chez vous faire dépendre de notre opinion ou connaissance les vertus, les vérités et les espèces. Elles sont dans la nature, soit que nous le sachions ou approuvions ou non: en parler autrement, c’est changer les noms des choses et le langage reçu sans aucun sujet.” (NE III.6.§39, p. 275)
Theophilus’s statement, in the midst of his discussion with Philalethes on the names of substances, seems to express in a lapidary way a basic opposition between Leibniz and Locke we are easily inclined to represent to ourselves: on one hand a bold conventionalistically-minded approach to the language-world relationship, aiming at emphasizing the mind-dependence and relativity of the conceptual framework by which we are accustomed to single out and describe the objects of our knowledge. On the other hand, the vigorous defence of the commonsensical assumption, according to which this framework is rooted in reality.
Actually, this picture reflects Leibniz’s overall attitude in his discussion with Locke in the Nouveaux Essays; I mean, his general concern in contrasting the conventionalist drift of the Essay, derived from the latter’s devastanding attack to the traditional substantialist/essentialist framework. Still, this polemical defence could hide to the reader a deeply- seated background of assumptions and problems, shared by both thinkers, that can be traced back to the beginning of Leibniz’s intellectual career, and makes the contrast of their respective solutions less staightforward than it might appear.
Nor is it easy to spell out exactly the relationship between Locke’s anti-realist concern and his fundamentally descriptivist account of the semantics of substance names. But here also, Leibniz’s defence of essentialism can be hardly captured, as one could expect in line with a standard alternative, by the appeal to a direct reference view of the kind we are nowadays familiar with.