Bryan Pickel (University of Edinburg)

May 19 TUE — 11.00-13.00

Aula Direzione del Dipartimento (Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano)

Truth and Structured Propositions

Abstract. Sincere speakers use declarative sentences to say what they think. A sentence is true or false just in case what it is used to say is true or false. So, the investigation of language and thought requires a metaphysics of the objects of thought, known as propositions. Recently, renewed worries about the unity of the proposition have been taken as a crucial stumbling block for any traditional conception of propositions. These worries are often framed in terms of how entities independent of mind and langauge can be representational or how they can have truth conditions. For example, King (2014, 47) argues, "no one has ever been able to explain how anything could have truth conditions by its very nature and independently of minds and languages." I argue that the best understanding of these worries shows that they should be solved by our theory of truth and not our theory of propositions. I propose a variant of the redundancy theory which can solve the worries. In particular, I endorse Ramsey's claim that 'it is true that Desdemona loves Cassio' expresses the same proposition as 'Desdemona loves Cassio'. I argue that this variant---which is modelled on Ramsey's remarks---avoids the typical pitfalls of other versions.